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for a publisher like Springer, and particularly lugubrious for a book commanding 
such a high price tag. Moreover, some of the transliterations are awkward; Lyapu- 
nov and Bunyakovski are more common than Liapounoff and Bouniakovsky. 
Nonetheless, this book is destined to become a classic. It should be read by 
every historian of mathematics, and should be a part of one's personal library, 
especially if it can be purchased at a reduced price. 
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The historiography of mathematics has a number of open boundaries, uch as 
those running toward contemporary mathematics, or toward the general historiog- 
raphy of the natural sciences. Not all of these boundary lines or regions are 
associated with unproblematical transverse discourses in which ideas and con- 
cepts are exchanged between the adjoining sides. One of these critical boundaries 
is that separating the historiography and the philosophy of mathematics. The 
twentieth century has witnessed the professionalization f both of these fields, 
together with the stabilization of their respective discursive practices. Still, for 
some time the concern for internal coherence has limited the themes for mutual 
discussion between historians and philosophers to a rather narrow range, includ- 
ing, for example, the emergence of set theory, Hilbert's metamathematical pro- 
gram, or G6del's results. 
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In recent years, however, the situation seems to have changed. Congresses on 
the philosophy of mathematics include historical sessions, and historical discus- 
sions acknowledge the importance of adequate conceptual frameworks for the 
understanding of the development ofmathematics. The book under review here is 
one of the publications documenting this mutual interest in the history and philos- 
ophy of mathematics [1]. At the same time, it shows the difficulties of exploring a 
region of discourse which is not yet structured by a set of generally accepted 
concepts, problems, and fundamental beliefs. 
The volume contains revised versions of papers presented at a multidisciplinary 
symposium on "Structures in Mathematical Theories" which took place in San 
Sebastian, Spain, in 1990. The disciplines represented at the symposium ranged 
from the history of mathematics (contributors are, among others, Joseph W. 
Dauben, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Eberhard Knobloch, and Michael S. Mahoney) 
and philosophy of mathematics (Solomon Feferman, Michael D. Resnik, et al.) to 
the philosophy of science (Joseph D. Sneed, Erhard Scheibe, et al.) and mathe- 
matics itself (Saunders MacLane, F. William Lawvere). 
In their "introductory afterthoughts," the editors characterize this volume as 
part of a "rather dramatic transformation and reorientation" (p. ix) in the field of 
the philosophy of mathematics. This transformation process is supposed to repre- 
sent a shift from what the editors call the "Neo-Fregean approach," focusing on 
the problem of logical foundations of mathematics, toward a "new" philosophy of 
mathematics, emphasizing empiricist conceptions of what mathematics i about 
and how mathematics develops [2]. Connected with this empiricist attitude is the 
conviction that it is misleading to consider only arithmetic or set theory as the 
domains of mathematics to be explained philosophically [3]. Instead, philosophy 
of mathematics should take the whole range of mathematical ctivity into account 
and, in particular, its roots in and applications to the "real world." Accordingly, 
many contributions to the volume discuss from one side or another problems 
regarding the applicability of mathematics, the relation between mathematics and 
physics, or the "quasiempirical" methodology ofdifferent branches of mathemat- 
ics. 
As the introduction suggests, the emphasis of the editors is on the philosophy of 
mathematics, and historical contributions are mainly thought of as providing evi- 
dence for the "new" empiricist position. In fact, a similar view can be found in 
some of the articles. Of the twenty-three papers collected in the volume, only six 
are explicitly intended as contributions to the history of mathematics. Whether 
the purely philosophical papers in fact contain arguments in favor of the "new" 
trend in the philosophy of mathematics will not be discussed here. Rather, the 
"multidisciplinary" intentions of the editors will be taken seriously. Now, a multi- 
disciplinary perspective (or, rather, multiple disciplinary perspectives) can con- 
tribute to discourse across the common boundary lines only when one perspective 
has something to offer which appeals to the professional view of the other disci- 
pline(s). A reader interested in the open space between the history and philosophy 
of mathematics will thus probably ask her- or himself which of the historical 
212 ESSAY REVIEWS HM 20 
articles collected in the volume offer new or challenging information for philoso- 
phers and, similarly, whether some of the philosophical contributions may serve 
to stimulate historical discussions. In fact, there appear to be some potentially 
interesting topics gathered together in this book, and the remainder of this review 
will concentrate on them. 
From history to philosophy. A nice historical case study in favor of the empiri- 
cist trend in the philosophy of mathematics i  Javier Echeverria's "Observations, 
Problems, and Conjectures in Number Theory--The History of the Prime Num- 
ber Theorem" (pp. 230-252). Echeverria's aim is to confirm the Polya-Lakatos 
account of mathematical practice as a process of inductive reasoning, guided by 
experience and intuition, for certain key developments in the field of number 
theory. Drawing on classical historical studies (e.g., [Landau 1909, Dickson 
1919]), he recounts the history of the conjectures on the distribution of primes 
from Euler's queries to the first proofs of the prime number theorem shortly 
before the turn of the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the history of prime 
number tables as testing devices for the different conjectures. Particular attention 
is given to the work of Gauss and Legendre, who extensively used and even 
improved the prime number tables of their time. Echeverria states his main thesis 
as follows: "Prime number tables play the same epistemological role in number 
theory as empirical measurements and data in experimental science" (p. 250). 
While it will not come as a surprise for historians that number theory has a rather 
empirical character, it may indeed be an interesting question for an epistemology 
of mathematics to account for such empirical aspects of the process of gaining 
mathematical knowledge. Echeverria suggests that this experimental cquisition 
of knowledge is not incidental, but typical in situations where a mathematical 
problem stands open for a long period of time. One might even ask whether 
Echeverria does not understate the phenomenon in question by reducing the 
empirical aspect of mathematical research to empirical tests of conjectures. Can 
tentative steps toward the proof of partial or related results, attempts to establish 
connections with previous knowledge, and similar elements of mathematical prac- 
tice not also be described as an experimental process? 
Two other papers dealing with nonstandard phenomena in the history of mathe- 
matics are Joseph W. Dauben's "Are There Revolutions in Mathematics?" (pp. 
205-229) and Ivor Grattan-Guiness' "Structure-Similarity as a Cornerstone of the 
Philosophy of Mathematics" (pp. 91-111). Dauben's article makes clear that the 
main problem in speaking of "revolutions" in the history of mathematics lies in 
the specific notion of a revolution which one chooses to use. While Dauben 
stresses everal diachronical breaks in mathematics, Grattan-Guinness points to 
certain synchronical analogies and interconnections between mathematical nd 
physical theories, which he calls "structure-similarities." An example would be 
the use of the notion of linearity in different branches of nineteenth-century math- 
ematics and physics. Again, a precise notion of such analogies would be very 
interesting philosophically. However, both texts leave the necessary conceptual 
clarifications to the reader. 
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It seems that such a clarification could start from semantic onsiderations. The 
key notions of both papers depend on an explanation of the meaning of mathemat- 
ical concepts. "Revolutions" are at least partially to be thought of as breaks in the 
semantics of mathematical language (Dauben, p. 208; cf. also Kitcher's thoughts 
on the "modification of reference potentials" [Kitcher 1983, 170]), and "struc- 
ture-similarities" are intended as explanations of "how a mathematical theory can 
mean" (Grattan-Guinness, p. 93). Neither of the authors is prepared, however, to 
go into the discussions of the semantics of mathematical language which have 
been central to the philosophy of mathematics since its emergence from the foun- 
dational debates at the beginning of our century. 
Perhaps the most interesting challenge for the philosophy of mathematics i  the 
historical contribution of Michael S. Mahoney, "Computers and Mathematics: 
The Search for a Discipline of Computer Science" (pp. 349-363). Mahoney re- 
views the emergence of the mathematical theory of computing from Turing and 
Shannon to the present day, stressing the fragile status of the theoretical concep- 
tions linking real calculating machines on the one hand and mathematical logics or 
formal semantics on the other. In computer science, nothing like a synthesis of a 
mathematical theory with a range of practical applications, comparable to that of 
Newtonian mechanics, is yet available. At the end of his presentation, Mahoney 
suggests that this is perhaps not due to the youth of computer science, but may 
rather be seen as a sign that a different constellation of relationships exists be- 
tween mathematics and its applications in the realm of computing. While in the 
case of classical applications of mathematics, "mathematization had elicited the 
essential simplicity of an apparently complex world," the mathematization f
computing has probably to acknowledge the irreducible complexity of computa- 
tions (p. 362f). Thus, Mahoney concludes, "the search for a mathematical struc- 
ture of computing may well involve a new historical and philosophical structure of 
mathematization" (p. 363). 
From philosophy to history. An interesting debate in the recent philosophy of 
mathematics centers on the so-called "indispensability argument." The argu- 
ment, which goes back to W. V. O. Quine and H. Putnam, is concerned with the 
reality of mathematical objects. Mathematical statements are indispensable in 
doing science, so it is argued, and therefore their referents (for example, quaterni- 
ons) should be considered exactly as real as those of, say, physical statements (for 
instance, atoms). Michael D. Resnik, in his article "Applying Mathematics and 
the Indispensability Argument" (pp. 115-131) tries to defend this argument 
against recent criticisms; for example, those of Hartry Field, who has claimed in 
his book Science Without Numbers [Field 1980] that the fruitful application of 
mathematics in science does not depend on its being true or on the existence of its 
objects. 
From an historical point of view, the interesting point of the argument, possibly 
counter to the intention of its defenders, is that the dispensability or indispensabil- 
ity of mathematical concepts seems to vary historically. Newton thought the 
214 ESSAY REVIEWS HM 20 
mathematics of "angles of contact" between curved arcs and their tangents was 
indispensable in his presentation of the motion of bodies; modern textbooks do 
not. How indispensable was mathematics at different stages of the history of 
science? Exactly which mathematical objects were indispensable? Does the argu- 
ment lead to an historically changing ontology of mathematics [4]? Does the 
indispensability of mathematics for the empirical sciences bring about the episte- 
mic or social legitimation of mathematics? These questions would seem to open an 
interesting field of historical inquiry to which philosophers will hardly address 
themselves. 
Not quite in the mainstream of the traditional epistemology of mathematics 
lies the distinction between "explicit" and "tacit" knowledge, due to Michael 
Polanyi [1958], on which Herbert Breger focuses in his "Tacit Knowledge in 
Mathematical Theory" (pp. 79-90). Breger offers a typology of tacit knowledge, 
together with some examples illustrating it. He conceives tacit knowledge mainly 
as a form of "know-how" [5] and distinguishes know-how for problem-solving, 
know-how for finding the right definitions and generalizations, and know-how for 
adequate axiomatization. Moreover, he lists the general "understanding of a the- 
ory" as well as the "knowledge of the trivial" (that which one cannot find in 
mathematical texts) as forms of tacit knowledge. While it is not clear whether 
these distinctions are more than an ad hoc typology, Breger is probably right in his 
opinion that understanding the role of tacit knowledge in mathematics provides a 
clue to some methodological questions in the history of mathematics. It is clear 
that the tacit knowledge of a mathematical community changes. This can, first, be 
one of the reasons for the strangeness of old texts, which originally assumed that 
the reader was acquainted with a tacit knowledge different from ours (p. 80). 
Second, the process of making explicit earlier tacit knowledge certainly repre- 
sents a rather general pattern of mathematical change (p. 82; Breger's example is 
the axiomatization of algebraic topology). It would be a difficult, but interesting, 
historical task to reconstruct in some cases the horizon of tacit knowledge which 
provided, so to speak, the frame of reference for the meaning of the mathematical 
texts written with this knowledge in mind. On this basis, one could then study 
which parts of this horizon were eventually transformed into explicit knowledge, 
and which parts were replaced or forgotten. 
While the reviewed papers provoke interesting questions for a substantial dis- 
course between the philosophy and the history of modern mathematics, as I have 
tried to show, most of the answers remain open. One has the impression that the 
real work is still to be done. Philosophers eldom rely on more than hints at the 
history of mathematics, and in some cases are not even aware of or interested in 
the historical implications of their work. Historians, in turn, often seem to have 
reservations about entering into a discussion of the different arguments which 
philosophy of mathematics has brought about so far, and about adopting the 
standards of conceptual clarity characterizing the best of its contributions. 
The contributions to the book under review show these difficulties quite clearly. 
HM 20 ESSAY REVIEWS 215 
It seems that both of  the communi t ies  involved would have to broaden (and 
deepen)  their  unders tand ing  of the prob lems raised in the d iscuss ions on the other  
side of  the boundary  if they are real ly interested in explor ing " the  space of  
mathemat ics . "  This appl ies to issues such as the phi losophical  p rob lem of  the 
( in)dispensabi l i ty  of mathemat ics  in empir ical  sc iences and the histor ical  exper i -  
ence of  d iverging forms of  mathemat izat ion ,  both of  which call into quest ion the 
rece ived view of  a f ixed methodo logy  and onto logy of  mathemat ics .  Perhaps it 
would be a good idea to hold a conference l ike the one leading to the present  
vo lume and to invite contr ibut ions  l ike "The  Semant ics  of  Mathemat ica l  Lan-  
guage for H is tor ians"  or  '°The H is tory  of  *** for Ph i losophers . "  Unfortunate ly ,  
no such contr ibut ions  are publ ished in The Space o f  Mathematics.  
A profess iona l  mathemat ic ian ,  such as Saunders  Mac Lane,  has the easiest  part  
to p lay in the h is tor ico-phi losophica l  game. Knowing  very well  f rom his own 
exper ience that "mathemat ics  is p ro tean"  and that no phi losophical  or  histor ical  
perspect ive  will ever  capture its essence,  he may ignore the diff iculties of  the 
latter and content  h imsel f  with the use of  a good metaphor ,  giving his wise advice:  
"May  protean unders tand ing  prosper ! "  (p. 13). 
NOTES 
1. Others would be [Aspray & Kitcher 1988], [Hersh 1988], and [Kitcher 1983], the latter of whom 
risks including in his empiricist epistemology of mathematics a "theory of mathematical change." A 
comparable t xt from the other side, which would include a philosophy of mathematics from the point 
of view of a historian, is still missing. 
2. The most representative recent ext for the first aspect would probably be [Kitcher 1983]. For the 
second aspect, the editors and several of the contributors (Grattan-Guiness, Ibarra/Mormann, Niini- 
luoto, Echeverria) refer to the (not quite so "new") position of Imre Lakatos. 
3. In fact, this view is justified only on the basis of a reductionist view of mathematics, beit in the 
form of the original Fregean and Russellian claim that a philosophical understanding of mathematics 
consists in the reduction of the concepts of "number," set," etc. to purely logical concepts, or in the 
more modern form of explaining mathematics by a reduction to set-theoretical axiomatics. 
4. In her talk at the 1992 Wittgenstein symposium on the philosophy of mathematics at Kirchberg, 
Austria, Penelope Maddy tried to dismiss the indispensability argument on this ground. 
5, He does not, however, make the obvious connection to Gilbert Ryle's distinction between 
"knowing that" and "knowing how" [Ryle 1949] or to the subsequent discussion of this distinction i  
the analytic theory of knowledge. 
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